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valiant attempt to sue his employer twice
for the same occupational injury, thus,
defeating the principle behind the
system of workers' compensation of
limiting an emplo]ers' liability.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of both the Court of Special
Appeals and the trial court and
adamantly refused to apportion the
claimant's injury between the two Acts.
In fact, in the area of workers'
compensation, the courts are generally
quite reluctant to apportion in such a
manner. See Newport News Shipbuilding
& Drydock Co. v. Fishel, 694 F.2d 327
(4th Cir. 1982) (single employer liable
for the claimant's hearing loss although
it was fully documented that the
claimant worked for numerous
employers). Apportionment between
state and federal systems is also not
permitted. See McCabe v. Sun
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the public policy considerations which
are an essential part of the workers'
compensation system. To allow this
type of apportionment would clearly
defeat the Congressional intent of
limiting an employer's liability for a
maritime worker's occupational injury.
Such apportionment between acts
would be in obvious conflict with the
LHWCA, 33 U.S.c. §905 (a) which
provides that "[ t ]he liability of an
employer prescribed in section 904 of
this title shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liablility of such employer to
the employee... ." Stanley, therefore,
manifests the intent of Congress
regarding the exclusiveness of liability
under the LHWCA and, presumably,
any possible apportionment between
Acts is an issue for the Congress and not
the courts to ultimately determine.
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Ben.Rev.Bd.Serv. (MB) 509 (1975),
rev'd. on other grounds, 593 F.2d 234 (3d
Cir. 1979). In Stanley, the court
determined that since the LHWCA
applied to a portion of the claimant's
injury, then the Act would provide
coverage for the entire injury.
The only case cited by Stanley as
providing authority for his position is

Verderane v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,
14 Ben.Rev.Bd.serv. (MB) 220.15,
BRB No. 76-244 (Aug. 13, 1981). At
issue in that case was whether the
claimant was a covered employee under
the Act during his long history of
employment, and the Benefits Review
Board ("Board") stated, "[W]e have
concluded that in determining
jurisdiction we must apply preamendment law to the period of
exposure prior to 1972 when the Act
became effective, and post-amendment
law thereafter;" 14 Ben.Rev.Bd. Servo
(MB) at 223. This statement, however,
was limited to the issue of determining
jurisdiction and was not applied by the
Board to determine the issue of
apportionment. Under this line of
reasoning, the Board found that
Verderane was covered under the preamendment Act, although not covered
after 1972. This fact, however, did not
deter the Board from holding that the
entire claim was compensable under the
LHWCA. "However, our conclusion
that claimant may have been exposed to
additional excessive noise during the
period when his employment was
outside the coverage of the Act does not
affect our determination that his vertigo
is compensable based on the earlier
exposure." Id. at 225.
The Stanley decision is in accord with

Put your
money where
your Heart is.

t.

O

American
Heart
Association

WE'RE FIGHTING FOR YOUR LIFE

IMPERFECT SELF DEFENSE
nState V. Faulkner, 301 Md.
482,483 A.2d 759 (1984), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
recognized that imperfect self defense
can be used by a defendant as a defense
to mitigate a conviction entered against
him. To prevail upon such a defense, the
defendant must show the jury that his
actions were based on a subjectively
honest but objectively unreasonable
belief that he had to resort to deadly
force to prevent his own serious bodily
injury or death.
Faulkner had been involved in an
argument outside of a Baltimore City
bar. This argument escalated into a fist
fight and then into a non-fatal shooting.
Subsequently, Faulkner was charged
with assault with intent to murder and
related offenses. At his trial in the
Criminal Court of Baltimore, the court
instructed the jury as to the defenses of
justification. Faulkner's request for a
jury instruction on imperfect self
defense was refused by the judge. The
jury subsequently found Faulkner guilty
of assault with intent to murder. On
appeal, the court of special appeals, in a
split decision, agreed with Faulkner, and
held that he was entitled to the
instruction of imperfect self defense
because he had produced enough
evidence to generate a jury issue
regarding his belief at the time of the
shooting. The court of appeals agreed,
and went on to hold that the defense of
imperfect self defense applies to the
offense of assault with intent to murder.
The mitigating defense of imperfect
self defense operates to negate malice,
which is the mental state that the state
must prove to establish the crime of
murder. The court began its opinion by
noting that the difference between
murder and manslaughter is the absence
of malice. Self defense operates as a
complete defense to either murder or
manslaughter. A proper claim of self
defense will justify the homicide and
result in a judgment of acquittal. On the
other hand, imperfect self defense is not
a complete defense to a crime, but
rather, is merely a mitigating defense
which operates to negate malice, thereby
reducing murder to manslaughter.
Similar to imperfect self defense are
the heat of passion defenses of mutual
combat, assault and battery and
discovering a spouse in the act of sexual
intercourse with another, which can also
be used by a defendant to mitigate a
conviction entered against him. The key
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distinction between imperfect self
defense and the heat of passion defenses
is that the defendant acted the way he
did due to a "fear of life" rather than a
heat of passion. The judicial recognition
of the imperfect self defense allows the
courts to avoid the choice between
murder and complete exonerations in
non-heat of passion cases where the
defendant's conduct warranted neither a
murder conviction nor an acquittal.
This defense requires the defendant to
bear some responsibility for the
homicide, even though he may have
lacked the requisite mens rea for
murder.
The court reviewed the history of the
imperfect self defense doctrine and
found that the case law revealed three
variations of the doctrine. Some courts
have applied the doctrine where the
homicide at issue falls within the perfect
self defense doctrine, except for the fault
of the defendant in provoking or
initiating the difficulty at the non-deadly
force level. Other courts have applied
the doctrine where the defendant
committed a homicide because of an
honest but unreasonable belief that he
was about to suffer death or serious
bodily harm. Still, other courts have
recognized the doctrine when the
defendant uses unreasonable force in
defending himself and as a result, killed
his opponent.
Prior to the Faulkner decision, the
court of special appeals had dealt with
six imperfect defense cases which
gradually expanded the application of
this mitigating defense to the criminal
defenses of imperfect defense of others,
Shuck v. State, 29 Md. App. 33, 349
A2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md.
733 (1976) imperfect defense of duress,
Wentworth v. State, 29 Md. App. 110,
349 A.2d 421 (1975), cert. denied, 278
Md. 735 (1976), and imperfect defense
of habitation, Law v. State, 29 Md. App.
457,349 A2d 295 (1975), cert. denied,
278 Md. 729 (1976).
Due to the Faulkner decision, the
defendant is now presented with a wide
range of mitigating defenses that serve to
reduce a conviction of murder to
manslaughter. As the Court stated, "A
defendant who commits a homicide
while honestly, though unreasonably,
believing that he is threatened with
death or serious bodily harm, does not
act with malice. Absent malice, he
cannot be convicted of murder.
Nevertheless, because the killing was
committed without justification or
excuse, the defendant is not entitled to
full exoreration. " Yet, according to the
court the defendant is entitled to a
10-Tht' La\\' Forllm SjJrillg, 1985

proper instruction to show the
defendant's subjective (honest) belief
that the use of force was necessary to
prevent imminent death or serious
bodily harm. Once the defendant has
established the existence of that belief,

the jury must reject the reasonableness
of that belief as well as the existence of
that belief itself to find the defendant
guilty of murder.
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DWI Rights
Chemical Sobriety Test
by Jennifer Hammond
he Maryland Court of Appeals
recently considered the issue of
whether a person who is apprehended for driving while intoxicated has
a constitutional right to consult counsel
before deciding whether to submit to a
chemical sobriety test. In Sites v. State,
300 Md. 701,481 A2d 192 (1984), the
court of appeals held that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth

T

Amendment of the United States
Constitution, as well as Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights,
requires that a person under detention
as a drunk driving suspect must, if the
suspect so requests, be permitted a
reasonable opportunity to communicate
with counsel before submitting to a
chemical sobriety test, as long as the

attempted communication will not
substantially interfere with the timely
administration of the testing process.
The laws concerning submission to a
sobriety test in Maryland are fairly clearcut. For instance, a chemical sobriety
test must be administered within two
hours "after the person accused is
apprehended." Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Code Ann. § 10-303 (1984). A person
may not be compelled to submit to such
a test and any refusal is not admissible at
a trial since no inference or presumption
concerning guilt arises as a result of
refusal to submit to the test. Md. Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-309 (1984).
Additionally, § 16-205.l(a) of the
Transportation Article - the "implied
consent" statute - explicitly states that
any person who operates a motor
vehicle in Maryland is deemed to have
consented to take a chemical test to
determine alcohol content if that person
is apprehended on suspicion of drunk
driving. Md. Transp. Code Ann. §16205.l(b) (1984).
Maryland driver who declines to take
the chemical sobriety test "shall" have
his license suspended for not less than
60 days or more than 6 months for a first
offense. Md. Transp. Code Ann. §16205.l(b) (1984).
As previously stated, the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Sites based its
decision on the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court,
citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), stated that, while the exact
contours of the due process clause are
not definable with precision, the
constitutional right of due process

